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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a methodology that allows to model behavioral trajectories of users in online social
media. First, we illustrate how to leverage the probabilistic framework provided by Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) to represent users by embedding the temporal sequences of actions they performed online. We then
derive a model-based distance between trained HMMs, and we use spectral clustering to find homogeneous
clusters of users showing similar behavioral trajectories. To provide platform-agnostic results, we apply
the proposed approach to two different online social media — i.e. Facebook and YouTube. We conclude
discussing merits and limitations of our approach as well as future and promising research directions.
Introduction
Over the last decade, the rise of online social media has caused a huge shift in the way people find
information, interpret facts, and shape their opinions. Facebook news feeds, Twitter timelines, and blogs are
replacing morning newspapers and nightly news. Nowadays everyone can produce and consume information
without any filter or restriction.
Such a disintermediated environment has proved to be a fiasco for the public’s understanding of current
affairs: clickbait news that pander to readers’ worst instincts are proliferating on blogs [1]; conspiracy
theories that simplify causation and reduce the complexity of reality are spreading more than stories that
are balanced and thoroughly reported [2, 3]; Facebook is flooded by fake news fabricated by fringe websites
[4, 5, 6, 7]; Twitter is swamped by bots [8] — algorithmically driven entities that on the surface appear
as legitimate users — distorting the political debate [9]; the emergence of virtual echo chambers — non-
interacting polarized communities centered on different narratives wherein enclaves of like-minded people
reinforce their preexisting beliefs [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] — is reducing viewpoint diversity and flattening debates
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
What is happening in online social media is worsening the political polarization, jeopardizing the qual-
ity of democratic discourse, influencing policy preferences, and encouraging behaviors strongly divergent
from recommended practices. For these reasons, a better understanding of the behavioral, cognitive, and
psychological processes underlying the observed dynamics is a matter that Science has to address.
In this work, we propose a methodology that leverages Hidden Markov Models [22, 23, 24] to represent
behavioral trajectories of users in online social media. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a probabilistic
model in which the system being modeled is assumed to be a Markov process with unobserved (hidden) states.
HMMs extend the framework provided by Markov chains in order to model systems in which the states (or
events) we are interested in are not directly observable. HMMs are traditionally known for their application
in temporal pattern recognition such as speech, gesture recognition, and bioinformatics [25, 26, 27]. Recently,
the application of HMMs has been successfully extended to computational social science — e.g. in [28] the
author provides novel evidence for the existence of an epoch-like structure of conflict and cooperation on
Wikipedia, distinguished by behavioral motifs.
The fundamental idea behind the approach that we are introducing is the following. In social network
analysis, we can observe actions performed by users — e.g. likes, comments, shares, retweets, etc. —, but
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the worldviews, inclinations, and orientations driving those actions remain hidden. It follows that Hidden
Markov Models — wherein the hidden states are supposed to cause observables outputs — might provide an
appropriate and convenient probabilistic framework for the modeling of behavioral trajectories of users in
online social media. In this paper, we show that HMMs can embed time series of different length representing
the comments left by users supporting conflicting narratives. For the sake of generalization and to provide
platform-agnostic results, we apply our methodology to two different online social media: Facebook and
YouTube.
Our results show that Hidden Markov Models are able to model behavioral trajectories of users by
embedding their visible actions in online social media. Besides the soundness of the intuition and the
straightforward idea motivating the use of HMMs in this context, the main strength of our approach is that
it allows to compare users that performed a different number of actions — i.e. users that are represented
by time series of different length. Indeed, we can compare users by using a model-based distance between
their HMMs, and then apply spectral clustering to discover homogeneous clusters of users showing similar
trajectories.
Materials and methods
Data Collection
To test the proposed methodology, we rely on a dataset already used in [29]. In particular, we use data
available for two random samples of 1.2K users that left at least 100 comments either on Facebook posts or
YouTube videos supporting different and conflicting narratives. Indeed, both the posts and videos considered
have been published by pages and channels disseminating either Conspiracy or Science news.
The first category (Conspiracy) includes pages and channels diffusing alternative and controversial infor-
mation, usually lacking supporting evidence and most often contradictory of the official news. The second
category (Science) includes scientific institutions and scientific press having the main mission of diffusing
scientific knowledge. Such a space of investigation is defined with the same approach as in [2], with the
support of different Facebook groups very active in monitoring the conspiracy narratives. Both pages and
channels were accurately selected and verified according to their self description.
The data collection started with the download of all the Facebook posts — and their respective users’
interactions — published by 419 US Facebook pages supporting either Science or Conspiracy. Then, we col-
lected metadata related to YouTube videos linked by such posts, as well as the associated users’ interactions.
The entire data collection process has been carried out exclusively through the Facebook Graph API and
the YouTube Data API, which are both publicly available, and for the analysis we used only public available
data (users with privacy restrictions are not included in the dataset). The pages from which we download
data are public Facebook and YouTube entities. User content contributing to such entities is also public
unless the users privacy settings specify otherwise and in that case it is not available to us. We abided by
the terms, conditions, and privacy policies of the websites (Facebook and Youtube).
Hidden Markov Models
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a probabilistic model in which the system being modelled is assumed
to be a Markov process with unobserved (hidden) states. HMMs extend the framework provided by Markov
chains in order to model systems in which the states (or events) we are interested in are not directly
observable. The basic structure of a HMM consists of a set of hidden states, each of which produces an
observable output (observation). A first-order HMM instantiates two simplifying assumptions:
1. The probability of a particular state depends only on the previous state:
Pr(xt|x1, . . . , xt−1) = Pr(xt|xt−1).
2. The probability of an observation ot depends only on the state that produced the observation — not
on any other states or any other observations — that is:
Pr(ot|x1, . . . , xt, . . . , xT , o1, . . . , ot, . . . , oT ) = Pr(ot|xt).
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of a first-order HMM.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of a first-order HHM. Gray shaded nodes represent the hidden states of the system.
The probability of a particular state of the system at time t depends only on the state of the system at time t− 1. White nodes
represent the observations produced by the hidden states of the system. The probability of an observation at time t depends
only on the (hidden) state of the system at time t.
Formally, a first-order HMM is defined by:
1. A set of hidden states X = {X1, . . . , X|X|}.
2. A set of visible states (observations) O = {O1, . . . , O|O|}.
3. A state transition probability matrix A = {aij}, where aij = Pr(xt = Xj |xt−1 = Xi), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |X|.
4. An observation probability matrix B = {bki}, where bki = Pr(ok|Xi), 1 ≤ k ≤ |O|, 1 ≤ i ≤ |X|.
Results
Modeling behavioral trajectories of users using HMMs
In this work, we show that is possible to use first-order discrete HMMs to model the behavioral trajectories
of users in online social media. The intuition supporting this approach is the following. In social network
analysis, we cannot observe the actual orientations of users towards a specific kind of content. Indeed, the
only things that we can observe are temporally ordered sequences of actions that users perform — e.g. tweets,
comments, likes, shares, etc. In this context, HMMs provide a convenient as well as intuitive probabilistic
framework to model the unobserved (hidden states) orientation of users by leveraging their observed (visible
states) actions in online social media.
Here we illustrate how to use the proposed methodology to model behavioral trajectories of users con-
suming contents supporting conflicting narratives — i.e. Science and Conspiracy (see Data Collection for
additional information). For the sake of generalization as well as to provide platform-agnostic results, we
apply our approach to different online social media — i.e. Facebook and YouTube.
For both Facebook and YouTube we focus on a random sample of 1.2K users with at least 100 comments.
Both samples are composed as follows. A first batch of 400 users with more than 95% of their comments on
posts (videos) supporting Science; a second batch of 400 users with more than 95% of their comments on
posts (videos) supporting Conspiracy; a third batch of 400 users with no more than 95% of their comments
on posts (videos) supporting either Science or Conspiracy. The users in the first and the second batches are
considered polarized towards either Science (PS) or Conspiracy (PC), whereas the users in the third batch
are not polarized (NP ). We choose to consider three balanced batches of users with different orientations to
obtain nice and interpretable results. Still, our approach does not need balanced data. Similarly, the choice
of considering users with at least 100 comments is arbitrary, since HMMs can be fitted with sequences of
shorter length — even if the longer the sequence the better the estimation of the HMMs parameters.
Since Facebook and YouTube data share the same structure, hereafter we make no distinction between
the two and we refer generically to users and their behavioral trajectories while introducing our proposed
methodology.
For each user we instantiate a HMM, λ, with three hidden states and two visible states. The three hidden
states represent the orientation of the user: polarized towards Science (S), uncertain (U), and polarized
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towards Conspiracy (C). The two visible states (observations) are comments on scientific contents (s) and
conspiracy contents (c). In these settings, each user is represented by a time series Y of visible events as
Y = { s s s c s c s c c s c c }.
Notice that while the number of the visible states is fixed and determined by the available data, the num-
ber of hidden states has to be specified using prior information or common knowledge about the phenomenon
under investigation.
Formally, each HMM λ is defined as follows:
1. A set of hidden states X = {S,U , C}.
2. A set of visible states (observations) O = {s, c}.
3. A state transition probability matrix A = {aij}, where aij = Pr(xt = Xj |xt−1 = Xi), i, j ∈ {S,U , C}.
4. An observation probability matrix B = {bki}, where bki = Pr(Ok|Xi), k ∈ {s, c}, i ∈ {S,U , C}.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the state transition probability matrix. Notice that there
is a non-zero probability of transitioning between any two states. Such a HMM is called a fully connected
or ergodic HMM.
We set A to be an uninformative state transition probability matrix, so that aij = 1/3 for each i, j ∈
{S,U , C}. Similarly, we set B to be an uninformative observation probability matrix, so that bki = 1/2 for
each k ∈ {s, c} and i ∈ {S,U , C}. Notice that one might consider to explicitly define different transition or
emission probabilities according to prior knowledge.
S U C
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the state transition probability matrix A. Each node represents a hidden state,
whereas each edge indicates a transition probability p = 1/3.
Each user i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is represented by a temporal sequence Yi of comments left in response to
scientific (s) or conspiracy (c) contents. For each user, we estimate the HMM parameters maximizing the
likelihood of the observations sequence Pr(Yi|λi) by means of the Baum-Welch algorithm [30]. In the end,
each user i is associated with a trained HMM λi, wherein the estimated parameters govern the transitions
between hidden states and the probability to observe a sequence of comments given the hidden states of the
users.
Constructing a similarity matrix
Now that each user i is associated to a trained HMM λi, we can construct a N ×N model-based distance
matrix L by computing the log-likelihood value for each pair of sequences and trained HMMs via forward-
backward algorithm [31]:
L = {`ij} = { log Pr(Yj |λi) }, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Since such a distance matrix is not symmetric, we need to define a new symmetric distance matrix D by
leveraging the information contained in L:
D = {dij} = { |`ii + `jj − `ij − `ji| }, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
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The symmetric distance matrix D represents the cross-goodness-of-fit of two sequences to the respective
HMMs. Finally, we construct a similarity matrix S = {sij} by applying the following radial basis function
kernel to each element of D:
sij =
{
exp
(
−dij2
)
i 6= j
0 i = j
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the similarity matrices obtained for Facebook (left panel)
and YouTube (right panel) users. Such illustrations convey two interesting messages.
First, by means of the model-based distance defined before, we are able to identify two large clusters
of users characterized by homogeneous behavioral trajectories. Such a result holds in both Facebook and
YouTube, and it makes sense since the strongest similarities are observed between users supporting the same
narrative — i.e. users supporting Science (PS) show similar behavioral trajectories, and the same apply for
users supporting Conspiracy (PC).
Second, in both Facebook and YouTube, the similarities between not polarized users (NP ) are weaker
than the ones between polarized users (PS and PC). In particular, we notice the absence of a unique
homogeneous cluster of not polarized users.
To address this last observation, in the next section we apply spectral clustering methods [32, 33, 34] to
the similarity matrices.
Figure 3: Graphical representation of similarity matrices. In both Facebook and YouTube, by means of the model-
based distance defined in the previous section, we are able to identify two large clusters of users characterized by homogeneous
behavioral trajectories.
Applying spectral clustering
Given a N ×N similarity matrix S, each elements sij can be viewed as the similarity between nodes vi
and vj . For an undirected graph G with nodes vi and edges sij , where i, j ∈ 1, . . . , N , the symmetric matrix
S is considered as the adjacency matrix for G.
Let ki =
∑
j∈V sij be the degree of vertex vi, and let K be a diagonal matrix with ki being its diagonal
element. We can obtain a normalized stochastic matrix:
M = SK−1.
Based on the definition of a Markov chain, mij represents the transition probability of moving from vi
to vj . In practice, we consider a matrix
Z = K−1/2MK1/2 = K−1/2SK−1/2,
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where Z is symmetric and stable in eigendecomposition. Then, the symmetric matrix Z can be decom-
posed into the following form:
Z = XΛXT ,
where X is a matrix obtained by stacking the eigenvectors of Z in columns, while Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λN )
is a diagonal matrix with the nonnegative singular eigenvalues in descending order along the diagonal —
that is, λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN ≥ 0. Since the top E eigenvectors, E ≤ N , can capture a significant amount
of information on the original data, we can map the original data into the E dimensional vectors in the
spectral domain, and then apply standard clustering algorithms based on the Euclidean distance such as the
K-means algorithm.
The next two figures illustrate the application of spectral clustering to the similarity matrices obtained
in the previous section. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of original data mapped in the spectral
domain. The eigenvectors associated with the first two eigenvalues contain enough information to let us
visualize three clusters: two almost orthogonal lines of points representing users polarized towards conflicting
narratives, and a cloudy shape of points situated at the intersection of the lines, that is representing not
polarized users. Figure 5 supports such an intuition by showing that the K-means algorithm applied to
polarized users mapped in the spectral domain clearly identifies two well separated clusters.
Figure 4: Original data mapped in the spectral domain. In both Facebook and YouTube, the eigenvectors associated
with the first two eigenvalues contain enough information to let us visualize three clusters: two lines of points representing users
polarized towards conflicting narratives, and a cloudy shape of points representing not polarized users.
Discussion
The rise of online social media has been found responsible for distorting the collective grasp on the truth.
Fake news, lies, and conspiracy theories are spreading faster than ever on Facebook, while Twitter is flooded
with bots manipulating the political discussion and influencing policy preferences. Meanwhile, the natural
tendency of individuals to search for information consistent with their preexisting beliefs — confirmation
bias — is driving the emergence of echo chambers, i.e. virtual communities wherein like-minded people
reinforce their beliefs and avoid dissenting information. The concept of truth itself is becoming more and
more blurred, and someone suggests that we are entering into a post-fact age [35], with obvious catastrophic
consequences for democracy and society.
In this dramatic scenario, Science has to provide a better understanding of the behavioral, cognitive, and
psychological processes behind the observed dynamics, as well as develop models able to approximate and
describe such processes.
In this paper, we propose a methodology that leverages Hidden Markov Models to represent behavioral
trajectories of users in online social media. The intuition supporting this approach can be summarized as
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Figure 5: K-means clustering. In both Facebook and YouTube, K-means algorithm applied to polarized users mapped in the
spectral domain clearly identifies two well separated clusters representing users polarized towards Science and users polarized
towards Conspiracy.
follows. In social network analysis, we cannot observe the actual orientations of individuals towards a specific
kind of content. Indeed, the only things that we can observe are temporally ordered sequences of actions
that individuals perform — e.g. tweets, comments, likes, shares, etc. Having said that, HMMs provide a
convenient as well as intuitive probabilistic framework to model the unobserved (hidden states) orientation
of individuals by taking into account their observed (visible states) actions in online social media.
To provide platform-agnostic results, we apply our methodology to two different online social media —
Facebook and YouTube — showing that our approach is able to discover homogeneous clusters of individuals
showing similar behavioral trajectories in both the platforms considered.
Clearly, we have to point out some limitations of the present work. First, given the complexity of human
behavior, any attempt to infer the actual orientation of individuals as well as their motivations is out of the
scope of the proposed methodology. Nevertheless, we think that our approach yields a useful approximation
and representation of behavioral trajectories that can be exploited to identify homogeneous clusters of users.
Then, we have to emphasize that our dataset is a particular dataset, and thus we cannot venture any general
claims. Context matters, and far more research would be necessary to support any such general claims.
A further limitation of the present study is the computational time required to train HMMs for a large
number of individuals. Still, we believe that the proposed methodology is straightforward to implement, and
supported by sound and intuitive theoretical foundations. Moreover, HMMs provide a flexible probabilistic
framework that can adapt to different contexts.
In particular, we think that our methodology could be used to investigate the effectiveness of fact-checking
[36, 37] and debunking of false information proliferating in online social media. Some studies pointed out
the inefficacy of debunking and the concrete risk of a backfire effect from the most committed partisans
[38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Differently, recent studies found that individuals heed factual information, even when
such information challenges their partisan and ideological attachments [44, 45, 46]. In this scenario, we think
that our approach might help in the identification of homogeneous clusters of individuals showing similar
reactions and behaviors with respect to debunking and fact-checking.
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